* Susceptible to politicised appointments, termination by politicians or senior officers
Parliament was clearly split into two camps: legislators who supported the Leader of the Opposition, Dithapelo Keorapetse, and those in the ruling party who rejected the proposal to amend the Corruption and Economic Crime Bill.
Keorapetse was seeking to amend the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (Cap.08:05) to make the Directorate more independent in form and function, thereby enhancing its efficiency that to amend section 2 of the Act by introducing an interpretation of the term Board as well as the establishment of the Board.
Although all across the aisle did agree that there is corruption in the country they differed in their opinions on what should be changed if needs be in the current Act. On Monday, Keorapetse emphasised that the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) is committed to a vigorous and relentless battle against corruption and the establishment of a transparent and accountable government.
He referenced page 19 of the 2019 Elections Manifesto, which states: “Corruption, nepotism, and patronage are pervasive in the public sector. They significantly undermine efficiency and service delivery.
“These issues stem from severe deficiencies in leadership and management, as well as weak accountability and oversight systems.” The UDC believes that reforming the public sector and removing accountability and oversight institutions from executive control is crucial.
Keorapetse noted that alongside poverty, unemployment, and underemployment, corruption has become a prominent issue in Botswana's economy, exacerbating problems such as mismanagement, unethical governance, secrecy, and lack of accountability. Various forms of corruption are evident in Botswana.
He argued that both bureaucratic and administrative corruption, as well as political and grand corruption, have been reported, with some cases reaching the courts. Investigations and prosecutions have occurred in cases involving bribery, conflict of interest, fraud, embezzlement, theft of government assets, money laundering, tax evasion, and abuse of office. On March 26, 2018, it was reported that since April 2018, eight cabinet ministers were investigated for suspected offences, including corruption and money laundering. Three were charged, but two were acquitted, and the third case was withdrawn with the possibility of reinstatement.
Furthermore, on March 28, 2018, the Minister in the Presidency informed Parliament that the DCEC had investigated suspected corruption involving 47 companies and their executives, with 28 being questioned. Since April 2008, 33 cases involving senior government officials above the rank of Director were investigated by the DCEC, with 21 questioned. However, corruption cases rarely reach court, and convictions are infrequent.
Keorapetse argued that Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index, which ranks 180 countries by perceived corruption levels, showed Botswana’s rating drop from 61 to 55 in 2021, falling from position 35 to 45 globally and from third to fourth in Africa, after Seychelles and Cape Verde. Additionally, the Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 68 from August 2020 found that 50 percent of Batswana believe the overall level of corruption had increased over the previous year, with elected government leaders being perceived as the most corrupt among key state institutions.
He noted that the percentage of citizens who believe that “most” or “all” officials in the Presidency are corrupt has increased significantly over the past decade, rising from nine percent in 2008 to 35 percent in 2019. Additionally, 70 percent of Batswana think that reporting corruption to the authorities puts individuals at risk of retaliation. Half of the population also believe that corruption has increased “somewhat” or “a lot” over the previous year.
Keorapetse told parliament that as of June 2022, the Office of the Receiver has received 38 court orders for the seizure of various properties. These seizures have included money, vehicles, cattle, office furniture, and immovable property such as offices and residential buildings. By March 31, 2022, the balance of the Confiscated Asset Trust Fund stood at P1, 802, 879. 42 accumulated from 2019/20 to 2021/22. This amount includes P1,
724, 021. 22 deposited by the Botswana Police and P78, 858. 20 from the Office of the Receiver.
As of March 2022, the total property portfolio under the Receiver’s management was valued at P230, 732, 163.42, which includes cash at bank amounting to P148, 847, 861.17 and residential properties worth P42, 753, 000.00.
Former Director General of the DCEC, Tymon Katlholo, estimated in June 2022 that P600 million had been lost to corruption over the preceding 11 months based on the cases he has investigated.
Keorapetse also highlighted that Botswana's Anti-Corruption Strategy, established in 1994, models its approach on those of Singapore and Hong Kong. The DCEC employs a three-pronged strategy encompassing investigation, prevention, and public education.
The fight against corruption and economic crime in Botswana is supported by various laws, including the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994, the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, the Banking (Anti-Money Laundering) Regulations, the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Service Act, the Financial Intelligence Act, the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act, the Whistleblowing Act, and the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act.
Regarding the shortcomings of the anti-corruption strategy, Keorapetse expressed concerns about the autonomy of the DCEC. He noted that the agency does not function with a high level of political commitment, operational independence, or adequate capacity in terms of investigatory powers, resources (both material and human), and integrity.
It is vulnerable to politicised appointments and terminations of its senior officers by politicians. Since the DCEC is part of the Ministry of State President, its director is appointed by and reports to the President, with the President also determining the terms and conditions of service (under the CEC Act).
Although the number of corruption allegations reported to the DCEC has decreased, the complexity, sophistication, and value of corruption have increased, evolving from petty to grand corruption.
A troubling aspect is that high-profile cases rarely lead to convictions, and some are never prosecuted at all for example, BMC, Botswana Railways, and DIS cases. There is a widespread perception that only minor offenders face conviction while major perpetrators evade justice.
Keorapetse provided examples that under President Mokgweetsi Masisi’s administration, the DCEC has had five different Director Generals—two acting and three permanents. The DCEC has experienced issues such as its officers being detained by the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services and its offices being sealed as crime scenes.
Additionally, two senior DCEC investigators were transferred to the Ministry of Health and the Francistown office while handling a significant investigation.
Recently, there was an attempt to transfer five senior DCEC officers, including investigators, by the PSP, and one senior officer’s contract was not renewed. The level of interference seeking to control the DCEC has been unprecedented, Keorapetse said.
Additionally, a consultancy report on the review of Botswana’s anti-corruption strategy conducted by Bertrand de Spevile in 2007 revealed several key findings: 98 percent of respondents want corruption addressed decisively; 93 percent believe the government should allocate more resources to combat corruption; 96 percent feel the DCEC should be free from external influence; 72 percent think it should no longer be part of the civil service; 12 percent suggest it should be a parastatal; 85 percent advocate for it to be an independent body like the Auditor General; 92 percent believe the Director's position should be legally protected, similar to the Auditor General or the Director of Public Prosecutions; and 71 percent think the directorate's staff should have employment terms separate from the civil service.
These results indicate that the DCEC operates under significant constraints and requires enhancements to its capacity and independence. Thus, the UDC proposes this Bill to strengthen and make the DCEC more autonomous, Keorapetse submittted.
He also highlighted that the UDC believes corruption, mismanagement leading to wasteful expenditure, maladministration, unethical governance, secrecy, and lack of accountability are severely damaging the economy. Corruption has undermined trust in public institutions and tarnished the legitimacy of the government.
Keorapetse urged that in addition to amending the Act as proposed, there should be the enactment of a Freedom of Information law, a comprehensive assets declaration law with full disclosure requirements, a stringent whistleblowing law, strict regulations on insider trading and trading in influence, public funding for political parties, and a formalised anti-corruption policy and master plan.
He emphasised that the DCEC needs to be adequately resourced and empowered to address the increasingly sophisticated and complex nature of elite corruption.
Keorapetse was seeking to amend the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (Cap.08:05) to make the Directorate more independent in form and function, thereby enhancing its efficiency that to amend section 2 of the Act by introducing an interpretation of the term Board as well as the establishment of the Board.
Although all across the aisle did agree that there is corruption in the country they differed in their opinions on what should be changed if needs be in the current Act. On Monday, Keorapetse emphasised that the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) is committed to a vigorous and relentless battle against corruption and the establishment of a transparent and accountable government.
He referenced page 19 of the 2019 Elections Manifesto, which states: “Corruption, nepotism, and patronage are pervasive in the public sector. They significantly undermine efficiency and service delivery.
“These issues stem from severe deficiencies in leadership and management, as well as weak accountability and oversight systems.” The UDC believes that reforming the public sector and removing accountability and oversight institutions from executive control is crucial.
Keorapetse noted that alongside poverty, unemployment, and underemployment, corruption has become a prominent issue in Botswana's economy, exacerbating problems such as mismanagement, unethical governance, secrecy, and lack of accountability. Various forms of corruption are evident in Botswana.
He argued that both bureaucratic and administrative corruption, as well as political and grand corruption, have been reported, with some cases reaching the courts. Investigations and prosecutions have occurred in cases involving bribery, conflict of interest, fraud, embezzlement, theft of government assets, money laundering, tax evasion, and abuse of office. On March 26, 2018, it was reported that since April 2018, eight cabinet ministers were investigated for suspected offences, including corruption and money laundering. Three were charged, but two were acquitted, and the third case was withdrawn with the possibility of reinstatement.
Furthermore, on March 28, 2018, the Minister in the Presidency informed Parliament that the DCEC had investigated suspected corruption involving 47 companies and their executives, with 28 being questioned. Since April 2008, 33 cases involving senior government officials above the rank of Director were investigated by the DCEC, with 21 questioned. However, corruption cases rarely reach court, and convictions are infrequent.
Keorapetse argued that Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index, which ranks 180 countries by perceived corruption levels, showed Botswana’s rating drop from 61 to 55 in 2021, falling from position 35 to 45 globally and from third to fourth in Africa, after Seychelles and Cape Verde. Additionally, the Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 68 from August 2020 found that 50 percent of Batswana believe the overall level of corruption had increased over the previous year, with elected government leaders being perceived as the most corrupt among key state institutions.
He noted that the percentage of citizens who believe that “most” or “all” officials in the Presidency are corrupt has increased significantly over the past decade, rising from nine percent in 2008 to 35 percent in 2019. Additionally, 70 percent of Batswana think that reporting corruption to the authorities puts individuals at risk of retaliation. Half of the population also believe that corruption has increased “somewhat” or “a lot” over the previous year.
Keorapetse told parliament that as of June 2022, the Office of the Receiver has received 38 court orders for the seizure of various properties. These seizures have included money, vehicles, cattle, office furniture, and immovable property such as offices and residential buildings. By March 31, 2022, the balance of the Confiscated Asset Trust Fund stood at P1, 802, 879. 42 accumulated from 2019/20 to 2021/22. This amount includes P1,
724, 021. 22 deposited by the Botswana Police and P78, 858. 20 from the Office of the Receiver.
As of March 2022, the total property portfolio under the Receiver’s management was valued at P230, 732, 163.42, which includes cash at bank amounting to P148, 847, 861.17 and residential properties worth P42, 753, 000.00.
Former Director General of the DCEC, Tymon Katlholo, estimated in June 2022 that P600 million had been lost to corruption over the preceding 11 months based on the cases he has investigated.
Keorapetse also highlighted that Botswana's Anti-Corruption Strategy, established in 1994, models its approach on those of Singapore and Hong Kong. The DCEC employs a three-pronged strategy encompassing investigation, prevention, and public education.
The fight against corruption and economic crime in Botswana is supported by various laws, including the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994, the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, the Banking (Anti-Money Laundering) Regulations, the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Service Act, the Financial Intelligence Act, the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime Act, the Whistleblowing Act, and the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Act.
Regarding the shortcomings of the anti-corruption strategy, Keorapetse expressed concerns about the autonomy of the DCEC. He noted that the agency does not function with a high level of political commitment, operational independence, or adequate capacity in terms of investigatory powers, resources (both material and human), and integrity.
It is vulnerable to politicised appointments and terminations of its senior officers by politicians. Since the DCEC is part of the Ministry of State President, its director is appointed by and reports to the President, with the President also determining the terms and conditions of service (under the CEC Act).
Although the number of corruption allegations reported to the DCEC has decreased, the complexity, sophistication, and value of corruption have increased, evolving from petty to grand corruption.
A troubling aspect is that high-profile cases rarely lead to convictions, and some are never prosecuted at all for example, BMC, Botswana Railways, and DIS cases. There is a widespread perception that only minor offenders face conviction while major perpetrators evade justice.
Keorapetse provided examples that under President Mokgweetsi Masisi’s administration, the DCEC has had five different Director Generals—two acting and three permanents. The DCEC has experienced issues such as its officers being detained by the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services and its offices being sealed as crime scenes.
Additionally, two senior DCEC investigators were transferred to the Ministry of Health and the Francistown office while handling a significant investigation.
Recently, there was an attempt to transfer five senior DCEC officers, including investigators, by the PSP, and one senior officer’s contract was not renewed. The level of interference seeking to control the DCEC has been unprecedented, Keorapetse said.
Additionally, a consultancy report on the review of Botswana’s anti-corruption strategy conducted by Bertrand de Spevile in 2007 revealed several key findings: 98 percent of respondents want corruption addressed decisively; 93 percent believe the government should allocate more resources to combat corruption; 96 percent feel the DCEC should be free from external influence; 72 percent think it should no longer be part of the civil service; 12 percent suggest it should be a parastatal; 85 percent advocate for it to be an independent body like the Auditor General; 92 percent believe the Director's position should be legally protected, similar to the Auditor General or the Director of Public Prosecutions; and 71 percent think the directorate's staff should have employment terms separate from the civil service.
These results indicate that the DCEC operates under significant constraints and requires enhancements to its capacity and independence. Thus, the UDC proposes this Bill to strengthen and make the DCEC more autonomous, Keorapetse submittted.
He also highlighted that the UDC believes corruption, mismanagement leading to wasteful expenditure, maladministration, unethical governance, secrecy, and lack of accountability are severely damaging the economy. Corruption has undermined trust in public institutions and tarnished the legitimacy of the government.
Keorapetse urged that in addition to amending the Act as proposed, there should be the enactment of a Freedom of Information law, a comprehensive assets declaration law with full disclosure requirements, a stringent whistleblowing law, strict regulations on insider trading and trading in influence, public funding for political parties, and a formalised anti-corruption policy and master plan.
He emphasised that the DCEC needs to be adequately resourced and empowered to address the increasingly sophisticated and complex nature of elite corruption.
