No current state security organ has ‘normalised’ arbitrary arrests like the DIS. It has become so ‘normal’ that, it is no longer a matter of why, it is just a matter of when. Spending a night or two at ‘Dark City,’ as holding cells at Sebele are ‘notoriously’ called, is almost becoming a ‘rite of passage’ for many of us.
I mean, from Welheminah ‘Butterfly’ Maswabi through Deputy Director General, Tefo Kgotlhane, to Dr. Thapelo Matsheka, it has been too many arrests but we are still counting. And just to be on the safe side, count yourself in. The tragedy is that, through all these arrests, there is absolutely nothing to show for it, but pilling lawsuit against State.
Essentially, taxpayers’ money is being wasted on these witch-hunt escapades and catfights under the veil of ‘national security.’ When Batswana seek answers to this daily drama, they are stone-walled with evocation of the term, ‘national security’. But what is national security, if everything is national security?
I am inclined to think, it is already proving dangerous to leave this ‘national security' space undefined. I am further of the view that it is proving to be nothing more than a convenient scapegoat for incompetence.
Intelligence services perform vital work, and the growing threats of terrorism, cyber-attacks, and sophisticated criminal networks have rendered more urgent their efforts to protect our security. Technological advancements have also made their work more complex, and the transnational nature of today’s threats has made it ever more challenging.
But scrutiny of government and its agents is of vital importance for the rule of law and democracy. This also applies especially to so-called special services whose activities are usually kept secret.
Security and intelligence services, the need for which cannot be put into doubt, must nonetheless not become a “state within the state”, exempted from accountability for their actions. Such a lack of accountability leads to a dangerous culture of impunity, which undermines the very foundations of democratic institutions.
In its arbitrary arrests, DIS is increasingly invoking “state secrecy” or “national security” in order to ward off public or judicial scrutiny of their actions. DIS legal blunders have become a dependable ‘cash-cow’ for Masisi’s political adversaries. Instead of delivering services to the people, the government is stuck with millions of Pula lawsuits to settle.
As far as its fruitless raids, lost court cases, and other accompanying theatrics are concerned, it is safe to conclude that extending Peter Magosi’s stay in office would be like putting a log in the water and expecting it to become a crocodile.
Botswana’s definitions of national security should be guided not only by a sensible understanding of what is truly vital to the nation’s security but also by what the nation can practically expect the government to do and not to do.
It is particularly important that the DIS and other agencies understand this point. An ‘all of the above definition of national security, which primarily suits political constituencies, will only lead to confusion, waste, distractions, and possibly even military failures as the Botswana government is asked to do things that are either beyond its capacity or, worse, tangential to the real mission of protecting the country from harm.
It is thus critical to identify what national security is not. The best way to do this is to establish clear criteria for what exactly constitutes a threat to national security.
The last thing the nation’s leaders should do is to mistake political dissent as a threat to homeland security; although surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities are necessary to evasive threats, it is imperative that Botswana’s leaders keep a bright line between watching terrorists and monitoring the political views of Batswana.
It is clear that policymakers need a sharper focus as to what is and is not national security. It cannot be all things to all people; if it were, it would be meaningless. The definition of national security must be limited not only to decide what the government should be expected to do but also, just as important, to decide what it should not do.
I mean, from Welheminah ‘Butterfly’ Maswabi through Deputy Director General, Tefo Kgotlhane, to Dr. Thapelo Matsheka, it has been too many arrests but we are still counting. And just to be on the safe side, count yourself in. The tragedy is that, through all these arrests, there is absolutely nothing to show for it, but pilling lawsuit against State.
Essentially, taxpayers’ money is being wasted on these witch-hunt escapades and catfights under the veil of ‘national security.’ When Batswana seek answers to this daily drama, they are stone-walled with evocation of the term, ‘national security’. But what is national security, if everything is national security?
I am inclined to think, it is already proving dangerous to leave this ‘national security' space undefined. I am further of the view that it is proving to be nothing more than a convenient scapegoat for incompetence.
Intelligence services perform vital work, and the growing threats of terrorism, cyber-attacks, and sophisticated criminal networks have rendered more urgent their efforts to protect our security. Technological advancements have also made their work more complex, and the transnational nature of today’s threats has made it ever more challenging.
But scrutiny of government and its agents is of vital importance for the rule of law and democracy. This also applies especially to so-called special services whose activities are usually kept secret.
Security and intelligence services, the need for which cannot be put into doubt, must nonetheless not become a “state within the state”, exempted from accountability for their actions. Such a lack of accountability leads to a dangerous culture of impunity, which undermines the very foundations of democratic institutions.
In its arbitrary arrests, DIS is increasingly invoking “state secrecy” or “national security” in order to ward off public or judicial scrutiny of their actions. DIS legal blunders have become a dependable ‘cash-cow’ for Masisi’s political adversaries. Instead of delivering services to the people, the government is stuck with millions of Pula lawsuits to settle.
As far as its fruitless raids, lost court cases, and other accompanying theatrics are concerned, it is safe to conclude that extending Peter Magosi’s stay in office would be like putting a log in the water and expecting it to become a crocodile.
Botswana’s definitions of national security should be guided not only by a sensible understanding of what is truly vital to the nation’s security but also by what the nation can practically expect the government to do and not to do.
It is particularly important that the DIS and other agencies understand this point. An ‘all of the above definition of national security, which primarily suits political constituencies, will only lead to confusion, waste, distractions, and possibly even military failures as the Botswana government is asked to do things that are either beyond its capacity or, worse, tangential to the real mission of protecting the country from harm.
It is thus critical to identify what national security is not. The best way to do this is to establish clear criteria for what exactly constitutes a threat to national security.
The last thing the nation’s leaders should do is to mistake political dissent as a threat to homeland security; although surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities are necessary to evasive threats, it is imperative that Botswana’s leaders keep a bright line between watching terrorists and monitoring the political views of Batswana.
It is clear that policymakers need a sharper focus as to what is and is not national security. It cannot be all things to all people; if it were, it would be meaningless. The definition of national security must be limited not only to decide what the government should be expected to do but also, just as important, to decide what it should not do.
