The bugle is called. The road to Cabo Delgabo was no longer a possibility, but a living reality.
Small as it may be, underestimate the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had proved their wrath in the arid sands of Somalia and hills and valleys of Lesotho. Many had credited it as an “well-oiled war-fighting machine.”
But Mozambique mission is proving to be a challenge for BDF. The death toll for Botswana Defence Force (BDF) from Mozambique mission is increasingly depressing. But even more depressing is that much of it is from non-combat activities.
There seems to be an ‘unconducive’ psycho-social environment. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is a Counterinsurgency Operation against, not just a sadistic and fanatic, but also a very illusive target.
The insurgency group, is locally known as "Al Shabaab" but labelling itself as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ (ASWJ). If reports that the group is cooperating with Islamic State are anything to go by, then the BDF may be in Cabo Delgado for a very brutal fight.
The solution to growing Islamist insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province still remains elusive. As things stand, SADC securocrats are moving at hypervelocity to cobble an appropriate security solution to a problem that is more complex than what meets the eye.
Today, non-state actors are one of the toughest challenges for state, regional, and global security. Despite numerous counterinsurgency campaigns on behalf of both domestic authorities and foreign actors and coalitions, insurgents have remained persistent and resilient in a growing number of intrastate conflicts.
This fact brings to light an objective reality: many states are engaging in ineffective counterinsurgency operations. Consequentially, insurgent groups are continuously able to mass mobilise communities in an alarming capacity, while afflicted states remain unable to attain and maintain security and stability within their borders.
Uncertainty is a hallmark of war. Uncertainty is an inescapable part of war. In order to mitigate this chronic uncertainty in war, the BDF would have to rely on intelligence, full-spectrum crystal-clear intelligence. It is the role of intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment.
The complexity of the political and religious situation in northern Mozambique has made it difficult for government officials and stakeholders, both local and international to draw conclusions about the group, its objectives, and its tactics.
Ansar al-Sunna has remained silent, not offering reasons for its attacks, its high degree of brutality, or its overall objectives. At the tactical level, Ansar al-Sunna does not claim credit for the violence it inflicts on communities.
This leads to a variety of questions about the group, its size, and its organisation, but also allows for the proliferation of disinformation within Mozambique and internationally.
Taking credit for acts of terror is common, especially in contemporary security environment where many groups are competing either to signal ideological purity or loyalty; public ownership of violence assumes importance.
In the absence of credit claims or group narratives, disinformation surrounding the group and its motives has flourished. The lack of a unified official narrative contributes to information deficits that have stymied government efforts to address the crisis, as well as provided it with an excuse for inaction.
In the same way that the absence of official credit claims or communiques has facilitated weak governmental responses to this crisis, Ansar al-Sunna’s silence has also allowed opportunistic external groups, such as ISIS, to claim connections to the group and assert partial responsibility for their attacks.
However tenuous this connection may be in reality, their insertion into a situation where rumours abound and confirmed facts are scarce has further complicated efforts to understand and address the threat posed by Ansar al-Sunna.
Essentially, BDF is operating in an ambiguous environment; the enemy is elusive, the intelligence picture is blurry. It is a very dangerous environment to operate in, even for the battle-hardened BDF Commandos.
Small as it may be, underestimate the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had proved their wrath in the arid sands of Somalia and hills and valleys of Lesotho. Many had credited it as an “well-oiled war-fighting machine.”
But Mozambique mission is proving to be a challenge for BDF. The death toll for Botswana Defence Force (BDF) from Mozambique mission is increasingly depressing. But even more depressing is that much of it is from non-combat activities.
There seems to be an ‘unconducive’ psycho-social environment. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is a Counterinsurgency Operation against, not just a sadistic and fanatic, but also a very illusive target.
The insurgency group, is locally known as "Al Shabaab" but labelling itself as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ (ASWJ). If reports that the group is cooperating with Islamic State are anything to go by, then the BDF may be in Cabo Delgado for a very brutal fight.
The solution to growing Islamist insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province still remains elusive. As things stand, SADC securocrats are moving at hypervelocity to cobble an appropriate security solution to a problem that is more complex than what meets the eye.
Today, non-state actors are one of the toughest challenges for state, regional, and global security. Despite numerous counterinsurgency campaigns on behalf of both domestic authorities and foreign actors and coalitions, insurgents have remained persistent and resilient in a growing number of intrastate conflicts.
This fact brings to light an objective reality: many states are engaging in ineffective counterinsurgency operations. Consequentially, insurgent groups are continuously able to mass mobilise communities in an alarming capacity, while afflicted states remain unable to attain and maintain security and stability within their borders.
Uncertainty is a hallmark of war. Uncertainty is an inescapable part of war. In order to mitigate this chronic uncertainty in war, the BDF would have to rely on intelligence, full-spectrum crystal-clear intelligence. It is the role of intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment.
The complexity of the political and religious situation in northern Mozambique has made it difficult for government officials and stakeholders, both local and international to draw conclusions about the group, its objectives, and its tactics.
Ansar al-Sunna has remained silent, not offering reasons for its attacks, its high degree of brutality, or its overall objectives. At the tactical level, Ansar al-Sunna does not claim credit for the violence it inflicts on communities.
This leads to a variety of questions about the group, its size, and its organisation, but also allows for the proliferation of disinformation within Mozambique and internationally.
Taking credit for acts of terror is common, especially in contemporary security environment where many groups are competing either to signal ideological purity or loyalty; public ownership of violence assumes importance.
In the absence of credit claims or group narratives, disinformation surrounding the group and its motives has flourished. The lack of a unified official narrative contributes to information deficits that have stymied government efforts to address the crisis, as well as provided it with an excuse for inaction.
In the same way that the absence of official credit claims or communiques has facilitated weak governmental responses to this crisis, Ansar al-Sunna’s silence has also allowed opportunistic external groups, such as ISIS, to claim connections to the group and assert partial responsibility for their attacks.
However tenuous this connection may be in reality, their insertion into a situation where rumours abound and confirmed facts are scarce has further complicated efforts to understand and address the threat posed by Ansar al-Sunna.
Essentially, BDF is operating in an ambiguous environment; the enemy is elusive, the intelligence picture is blurry. It is a very dangerous environment to operate in, even for the battle-hardened BDF Commandos.
