We have been vindicated on DIS rot- Saleshando
President of the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) Dumelang Saleshando says they have been vindicated that there is rot at Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), a mess the head of state is not ready to clean.
Saleshando indicated that the revelations made in the prosecution docket by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) against the DIS Director General Peter Magosi speaks volumes and support their concerns regarding the running of affairs by the DIS and the abuse of office by its leader.
The conclusion of prosecution docket report is that Magosi has acted arbitrarily and abused his authority in directing for government department not to deal with China Jiansu International (CJI) as the company is a security threat.
According to the DCEC investigators a report was received anonymously that Magosi abused his office or authority by directing that China Jiansu International (CJI), a company that had won tenders with government be terminated on account of alleged national security.
Another report was received whereby the DIS had wanted the DCEC and Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) to facilitate the suspension of a payment of P112 million which was an out of court settlement for the termination of the Mmamashia Water Treatment Plant Expansion.
The tender had been awarded to China Jiangsu International/Unik Construction Engineering joint venture. The investigators have recommended that Magosi be slapped with abuse of office charge.
Saleshando told Botswana Guardian this week that they have been vindicated. He said the concerns they have expressed all along even to President Mokgweetsi Masisi about the DIS have been proven in the docket. He stated that the DIS is rotten to the core.
“Its leadership is using the organisation for self-interest and has no regard for national interest. We will certainly be calling on the Minister responsible for the DIS to account and confirm if Director General was indeed investigated and why the docket has not been forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) for possible prosecution,” Saleshando said.
In November 2020 Saleshando submitted to the office of Speaker of National Assembly, resignation letters from opposition members who were selected by President Masisi to serve in the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security Services.
The Intelligence and Security Service Act provides for the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security which is appointed by the President after consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly.
According to Saleshando, who is a former Leader of Opposition, the decision not to be part of the committee comes after the President could not commit to prioritisation of the issues that Saleshando presented to him on cleaning up and fixing the DIS.
He said during the meeting with Masisi, the president’s narrow interest was on meeting the minimum legal requirements. In essence, the meeting was meant to “tick a box” and carry on with the business-as-usual approach, Saleshando said.
He revealed that on behalf of the Parliamentary Opposition, he informed the President that they will not be part of a fruitless exercise that will have no impact in reversing the rot at the DIS. It is in the nation’s interest, he said, for the leadership to investigate the DIS corruption and looting and also review the law to avoid the pitfalls that have defined the journey of the DIS.
To this end, none of the Opposition Members of Parliament will serve in the President's Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security, he added.
“Our decision not to be part of the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence does not amount to abdication of our duties, as some social commentators have suggested. We are fully committed to our duties as opposition legislators.
“Standard Parliamentary practice does not permit for members of the executive to play any role in the selection of Parliamentary Oversight Committees. In the case of the DIS Committee, it is appointed by the head of the executive and reports exclusively to the President.
“It is in essence a President’s Committee on Intelligence and not a Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence. We will however continue to hold the DIS accountable for the use of public resources through the Public Accounts Committee, a committee that is appointed in accordance with internationally-accepted standards for Parliamentary Oversight.
“There is no need for the opposition to play any part in a cosmetic exercise geared at sanitising the Dirty and Broken DIS,” Saleshando said.
According to the prosecution docket prepared in May 2022 by Andria German (Senior Assistant Director), Tsholofelo Bareetsi (Principal Anti-Corruption Officer) and Sethunya Rathedi- Motswetla (Principal Anti-Corruption Officer), Magosi issued a savingram stating that a company or an entity called China Jiansu International (Pty) Ltd was a threat to national security whilst in truth and in fact he knew this to be false.
Further, he engaged verbally and on telephone to direct the termination of all projects where the said entity was engaged by government.
“No such threat had been discovered during their (DIS) investigations. Even if such a threat was noted, the outcome of any investigation had not been brought before the Central Intelligence Committee established under section 25 of the Intelligence and Security Service Act [CAP 23:02] to be dealt with in accordance with section 26 of the same Act.
“The role of the DIS or its DG in relation to the Central Intelligence Committee being to bring reports to the Committee which would then give direction as to how the matter should be progressed. It became apparent subsequently that the national security threat, though alleged to be in relation to the entity CJI, was in fact related to the Managing Director Cui Wanglin.
“This conclusion is deduced from the fact that Cui Wanglin was removed from the directorship of the company and a letter was authored to the same company that due to that removal CJI was no longer in the blacklist.
“The removal of Cui Wanglin was at the behest of the accused, Peter Fana Magosi. Peter Fana Magosi arbitrarily arrived at a decision to bar CJI from dealing with government and further revoked his own decision without recourse to the relevant structure within the Intelligence and Security Service Act.”
The report states that Central Intelligence Committee (CIC) chaired by the President has to be engaged. Critically, evidence came to the fore that though it was a requirement of the Intelligence and Security Service Act to file the findings of a possible threat to national security for guidance by the CIC on what should thereafter be done, the accused Peter Fana Magosi never filed any report with the Central Intelligence Committee, the investigators said.
They revealed that the issue relating to CJI and/or Cui Wanglin as a national security threat was never filed with the relevant authority but the accused person took a unilateral decision to label the company as such and proceeded to direct that no government entity should deal with CJI as this would be detrimental to national security.
“Critically and also worth noting is that at the time, the accused person had initiated an investigation into the suspected corrupt practices by CJI and these had borne no fruit. The investigation of corruption does not fall within the mandate of the DIS.
“Despite this realisation by his own team, he still proceeded to label CJI as a national security threat. Worth noting again, is the fact that although representations were made to the ministry by the accused that it was CJI whose activities were bordering on the threat to national security, it turned out during the course of investigations that in fact the accused had issues not with CJI but with the Managing Director, Cui Wanglin,” the summary prosecution report reads.